Nèdeem Elmahjoub's blog

A good summary by Hossam el-Hamalawy . I think though that the MEE restricted how much Hossam could write and elaborate. “[Unlike his predecessor Mubarak,] Sisi does not manage dissent; he eradicates it. Rabaa was not just a massacre. It was the founding social contract of Sisi’s new republic.” As of the ‘Western’ support of the Egyptian regime revolves around 1. Israel. 2. We supported Morsi and ‘a democratic process’, but the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to guarantee stability. So, we support whoever can guarantee stability and protect our interests.  More importantly, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt had already led the counterrevolution at a very early stage. The Muslim Brotherhood merely accepted the ‘new’ framework, including Morsi’s immediate submission to the American’s imperialism . As Adam Hanieh wrote  in 2012 : “ Many commentators portrayed Morsi’s victory as a significant challenge to SCAF’s domination and an electoral rejection of the Mubarak regime with

Excerpts “The ideological character of the uprisings went through a similar evolution. In the early stages, the revolutionaries fashioned themselves as belonging to a post-ideological movement. In reality, though, they were as ideological as any political movement — but their worldview simply mirrored international liberal norms, a doctrine so thoroughly internalized that it seemed like common sense. The movements for democracy were articulated through an individualistic, rights-based discourse, with a special emphasis on human rights. Among the revolutionary leadership, there was almost no talk of substantive equality, wealth redistribution, or property relations. The liberal revolutionaries appealed to the “international community,” which usually meant the Western powers. To understand what happened, we must grapple with the changing social structure in the Arab world over the previous four decades. Both liberal and left explanations fall short because they ignore the role of class i