The cosmopolitan project for unifying humanity through the agency of the dominant capitalist states—on the normative basis that we are all individual global citizens with liberal rights—will not work: it is more likely to plunge the planet into increasingly divisive turmoil.
There is another version of cosmopolitanism abroad today, which places at the centre of its conception of a new world order the notion of a democratic global polity. This comes in a number of different editions, some scarcely distinguishable from liberal cosmopolitanism save for more voluble democratic piety. But in its most generous version, exemplified by Daniele Archibugi’s essay in these pages, this is a programme with the great merit of seeking to subordinate the rich minority of states and social groups to the will of a global majority, in conditions where the bulk of the world’s population remains trapped in poverty and powerlessness. Yet even its best proposals suffer from two crippling weaknesses. They focus too narrowly on purely political institutions, while ignoring the fact that a Herculean popular agency would be required to realize even these against the united colours of the Pacific Union. Any prospect of bringing humanity towards genuine unity on a global scale would have to confront the social and economic relations of actually existing capitalism with a clarity and trenchancy from which most representatives of this current shrink; and any hope of altering these can only be nullif i ed by evasion or edulcoration of the realities of the sole superpower. Timothy Brennan has criticized the self-deceptions of a complacent cosmopolitanism of any stripe. The best antidote to them comes from clear-minded advocates of the present order itself. As Robert Kagan and William Kristol wrote, with tonic accuracy, in the National Interest (Spring 2000):
In other words, US power will not come to an end until it is actively detained. No scheme for universal harmony, however long-term, is credible if it tries to sidestep it.
— Peter Gowan, "Neoliberal Cosmopolitanism", New Left Review September-October 2001
Then came the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The great recession of 2007/08 has not undermined US power projection. Neither has the crisis in the EU nor Russia's intervention in Ukraine and Syria. The level of inequality today, the trade 'war' with China and a prospect of an intervention in Venezuela, among others, are a confirmation of a behaviour of a hegemon, cloaked in 'liberalism' and 'human rights', but whose practice of 'free trade' has to maintain her global primacy.
There is another version of cosmopolitanism abroad today, which places at the centre of its conception of a new world order the notion of a democratic global polity. This comes in a number of different editions, some scarcely distinguishable from liberal cosmopolitanism save for more voluble democratic piety. But in its most generous version, exemplified by Daniele Archibugi’s essay in these pages, this is a programme with the great merit of seeking to subordinate the rich minority of states and social groups to the will of a global majority, in conditions where the bulk of the world’s population remains trapped in poverty and powerlessness. Yet even its best proposals suffer from two crippling weaknesses. They focus too narrowly on purely political institutions, while ignoring the fact that a Herculean popular agency would be required to realize even these against the united colours of the Pacific Union. Any prospect of bringing humanity towards genuine unity on a global scale would have to confront the social and economic relations of actually existing capitalism with a clarity and trenchancy from which most representatives of this current shrink; and any hope of altering these can only be nullif i ed by evasion or edulcoration of the realities of the sole superpower. Timothy Brennan has criticized the self-deceptions of a complacent cosmopolitanism of any stripe. The best antidote to them comes from clear-minded advocates of the present order itself. As Robert Kagan and William Kristol wrote, with tonic accuracy, in the National Interest (Spring 2000):
Today’s international system is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony. The international financial institutions were fashioned by Americans and serve American intersts. The international security structures are chiefly a collection of American-led alliances. What Americans like to call international ‘norms’ are really reflections of American and West European principles. Since today’s relatively benevolent circumstances are the product of our hegemonic influence, any lessening of that infl uence will allow others to play a larger part in shaping the world to suit their needs . . . American hegemony, then, must be actively maintained, just as it was actively obtained.
In other words, US power will not come to an end until it is actively detained. No scheme for universal harmony, however long-term, is credible if it tries to sidestep it.
— Peter Gowan, "Neoliberal Cosmopolitanism", New Left Review September-October 2001
Then came the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The great recession of 2007/08 has not undermined US power projection. Neither has the crisis in the EU nor Russia's intervention in Ukraine and Syria. The level of inequality today, the trade 'war' with China and a prospect of an intervention in Venezuela, among others, are a confirmation of a behaviour of a hegemon, cloaked in 'liberalism' and 'human rights', but whose practice of 'free trade' has to maintain her global primacy.
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