An analysis with good insights, but like a typical revolutionary socialist approach it tends to be too optimistic.

The Algerian movement against the regime tends to tilt towards reforms, reforms to be granted by the regime under pressure from the street. It reminds me of the Tunisians' demands after the flight of Ben Ali.

Given the decades long of entrenched "civil society", NGOs, and the hegemony of international "liberal" order, with focus on entreprenurship, "human rights", etc. and the interests of the major imperialist states in preserving stability with focus on "development" within domination, the project of revolution against an authoritarian unjust system has been depicted as an out-of-date prospect. This has been exasperated by the wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen and the defeat in Egypt. Thus the fear of radicalism to carry out a meaningful real change.

There is no intention to challenge the existing institutions and build a dual power. Instead, there is demand to reform the existing structures of power. There is a stress on "democracy" but not on radicalism, property relations, social justice, etc. And as long as there is no cracks in the army the counter-revolution will have the upper hand. I also don't think that the cumulative process has matured enough neither within the movement nor within the regime. The latter has not entered a deep crisis yet.

It seems that what exists now is a horizontal network that has no intention of taking power, state power. I think because ideologically and strategically, they are not able to address the issue of state power.

One needs to see an analysis that includes the major political parties on Algeria: the FSS, the Workers Party and the "Islamists" (the traditional as well as the "liberal free market" ones). 

"Power to the revolutionary workers and youth"