Daniel Bax has missed to mention some fundamentals in critiquing "The Derelict House of Islam"
One needs to begin with how the "West" developed economically and technologically, framing the issue in the pre-capitalist and capitalist formation(s). Bax has missed the political-economy sphere.
The reference for writers like Ruud Koopman is the capitalist West. Hence the question is: why has capitalism in some countries developped "better" in others or has developed "unevenly" in general? It is capitalism that brought new ways of education, innovation, science and exploitation of nature and labour. Technological development, accumulation of capital (with violence at home and abroad) and productivity propelled development. Two world wars and the Holocaust also played a role and were part of capitalist development.
Why did the attempt of industrialisation and capitalist development by "secular" states such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria in the 1950s and 1960s was halted? What did the liberation movement in the MENA region intend to achieve, what gains, limited as they were, did instil in constitutions and practice, what were the conditions that gave rise to the Islamist movement and who gave them support during the "cold war"?
What were the legacies of the colonial powers in terms of sectarianism (e.g France in Syria), the constitutions they had helped draw, including Victorian moral laws, the type of regimes they installed or helped install, then the support of the local ruling classes after the end of official colonialism. For example, only in the last few years that Tunisia and Lebanon began changing articles related to homosexuality dating back to the colonial era. Why, unlike many other countries with a predominantly Muslim majority, Tunisian women even before 2011 enjoyed more rights than women in a similar country.
Why have only a handful of rentier-economies countries reached what they reached and what has been the role of class and the major powers in shaping their form of economy to make it fit in the international circuit of finance capital, and therefore gaining protection and arms sales privileges/advantages?
Like in the West, what class, or an alliance of classes, takes power and embark on change is fundamental in determining outcomes. "Religion" in the Western capitalist countries has been marginalised within class conflict and develoment of capitalist institutions and infrastructure. Christian fundamentalism in the US is a reactionary force and significant yet the US is a highly developped capitalist country.
As a few scholars have pointed out, there is a misconception (and a miseducation) of how the dominant capitalist states have become dominant. Isolating the global political economy from the picture is convenient in rehearsing the cultural/civilisational specificities.
The writer makes a good point though by referring to the uprisings in Algeria, Sudan, Iraq and Lebanon. More generally, he should have mentioned that not a single Arab uprising since 2011 began with raising Islamist slogans. It is onlt afterwards within the context of balance of forces, foreign intervention, lack of strategy and radicalism and the hegemony of the "neoliberal" form of capitalist ideology that the uprisings took the forms they did. Different forces of counter-revolutions, "secular" nationalist and Islamist ones, prevailed. Koopman and co are not interested in analysing that because they choose not to see the potentialities of change, but only stagnation that fits their ideological perspective to sell it to a certain audience to reinforce prejudices, cultural superiority and fear of the Other.
One needs to begin with how the "West" developed economically and technologically, framing the issue in the pre-capitalist and capitalist formation(s). Bax has missed the political-economy sphere.
The reference for writers like Ruud Koopman is the capitalist West. Hence the question is: why has capitalism in some countries developped "better" in others or has developed "unevenly" in general? It is capitalism that brought new ways of education, innovation, science and exploitation of nature and labour. Technological development, accumulation of capital (with violence at home and abroad) and productivity propelled development. Two world wars and the Holocaust also played a role and were part of capitalist development.
Why did the attempt of industrialisation and capitalist development by "secular" states such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria in the 1950s and 1960s was halted? What did the liberation movement in the MENA region intend to achieve, what gains, limited as they were, did instil in constitutions and practice, what were the conditions that gave rise to the Islamist movement and who gave them support during the "cold war"?
What were the legacies of the colonial powers in terms of sectarianism (e.g France in Syria), the constitutions they had helped draw, including Victorian moral laws, the type of regimes they installed or helped install, then the support of the local ruling classes after the end of official colonialism. For example, only in the last few years that Tunisia and Lebanon began changing articles related to homosexuality dating back to the colonial era. Why, unlike many other countries with a predominantly Muslim majority, Tunisian women even before 2011 enjoyed more rights than women in a similar country.
Why have only a handful of rentier-economies countries reached what they reached and what has been the role of class and the major powers in shaping their form of economy to make it fit in the international circuit of finance capital, and therefore gaining protection and arms sales privileges/advantages?
Like in the West, what class, or an alliance of classes, takes power and embark on change is fundamental in determining outcomes. "Religion" in the Western capitalist countries has been marginalised within class conflict and develoment of capitalist institutions and infrastructure. Christian fundamentalism in the US is a reactionary force and significant yet the US is a highly developped capitalist country.
As a few scholars have pointed out, there is a misconception (and a miseducation) of how the dominant capitalist states have become dominant. Isolating the global political economy from the picture is convenient in rehearsing the cultural/civilisational specificities.
The writer makes a good point though by referring to the uprisings in Algeria, Sudan, Iraq and Lebanon. More generally, he should have mentioned that not a single Arab uprising since 2011 began with raising Islamist slogans. It is onlt afterwards within the context of balance of forces, foreign intervention, lack of strategy and radicalism and the hegemony of the "neoliberal" form of capitalist ideology that the uprisings took the forms they did. Different forces of counter-revolutions, "secular" nationalist and Islamist ones, prevailed. Koopman and co are not interested in analysing that because they choose not to see the potentialities of change, but only stagnation that fits their ideological perspective to sell it to a certain audience to reinforce prejudices, cultural superiority and fear of the Other.