[T]he rejection of state-centric nationalism, while desirable, could leave a discursive space that sectarian or despotic groups could occupy. This explains why supra-nationalist and infra-nationalist groups with Islamic, tribal, and ethnic identities dominate the scene. Due to these competing identities, which are functioning at the local and trans-local levels, popular nationalism is facing a major challenge as it attempts to counter state nationalism.
Popular nationalism could be overtaken by other competing ideologies. Most opposition leaders are detached from people’s everyday realities. They are mostly busy producing centralized and exclusive narratives that are in many ways a replica of the regime’s ideology.]
Noticeable from the start though, in the early period of popular nationalism women were mostly invisible in street activities although a few took part in the beginning of the revolution. During the toppling of the Assad regime by the leading force of HTS, women were hardly present even in the celebrations.
******
Nation Against State: Popular Nationalism and the Syrian Uprising (2)
Is the current revolt decolonial?
The current revolt is producing its own nationalism, while at the same time countering the despotic ideology of the Baath party. As such, two nationalisms are competing for dominance. The first one is popular and anti-dictatorial, while the second is official and claims to be anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist. The first resonates with the nationalism of the Great Syrian Revolt of the 1920s, while the second is the heir of pan-Arabism of the 1950s and 1960s. The first was experimental, while the second followed a scripted program. The former’s main objective was decolonization; the latter’s goal was, and remains, autocratic rule. Nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s was influenced by Nasser’s centralization of power, but had a much less ambitious developmentalist goal.
The current uprising is producing a new nationalism that strives to delink gradually from the state-centric nationalism of the Baath party and reinvent itself, in part, by reconnecting with the nationalism of the early twentieth century. The process of delinking is delicate and risky. If it is performed too slowly, it could be co-opted or subverted. However, the rejection of state-centric nationalism, while desirable, could leave a discursive space that sectarian or despotic groups could occupy. This explains why supra-nationalist and infra-nationalist groups with Islamic, tribal, and ethnic identities dominate the scene. Due to these competing identities, which are functioning at the local and trans-local levels, popular nationalism is facing a major challenge as it attempts to counter state nationalism.
Popular nationalism, which this chapter investigates in more depth in Manbij, should be understood as a dynamic cultural praxis. It could morph into a Manichean ideology; it could also evolve into a Fanonian new humanism. In addition, it could be overtaken by other competing ideologies. Most opposition leaders are detached from people’s everyday realities. They are mostly busy producing centralized and exclusive narratives that are in many ways a replica of the regime’s ideology.31 The nationalism that protesters are producing with their bodies, emotions, dances, and various praxes is promising, but has been gradually marginalized.32 Popular nationalism was dominant before the militarization of the revolution, and stayed influential until the end of 2013. It is also competing with transnational Islamism in the liberated regions such as Manbij.
In the following section, popular nationalism is explored in the context of the liberated city of Manbij between 2011 and early 2014. In those liberated regions, nationalism is deployed to solve everyday problems. As Fanon explains: “The living expression of the nation is the moving consciousness of the whole of the people; it is the coherent, enlightened action of men and women.”33 Against the Manichean worlds that both the regime and a sizable segment of opposition groups are attempting to impose on Syrians, people are resisting by producing polyphonic narratives. Unlike official nationalism, decolonial nationalism is plural. It is based on a politics of rupture from the nationalism of the 1960s and a critical rediscovery and reconnection with the nationalism of the 1920s.
Manbij: a case study
The study of popular nationalism in contemporary Syria necessitates an exploration of everyday praxes, beings, and spaces to comprehend its scope and implications. It is the result of myriad experimentations that Syrians are undertaking in various sites. Unlike official nationalism, which is centralized, rigidly structured, and unambiguous, popular nationalism is decentralized and multi-vocal. It develops through countless interactions in numerous localities. Baath nationalism is based on unchanging abstract narratives, while popular nationalism is iterative and adjusts constantly to adapt to new situations. Popular nationalism is adaptive and highly malleable, since it is still in its early period of formation. It is saturated with uncertainties.
To explore the significance of the emergent paradigm, the next section focuses on Manbij, a strategic space for the study of the various moments of popular nationalism. These moments are not necessarily generalizable to other regions, but could help us comprehend the complexities of an emergent identity. The northern city, which was controlled by the revolutionaries for 18 months from mid-2012 to late 2013, provides an excellent point of entry for the exploration of three vital moments.
The first takes place during the early period of the revolt, before the liberation of Manbij. This period is characterized by subterranean nationalism that attempts to find its way to the surface. It is a clandestine nationalism that could be explored in marginal localities and peripheral spaces. The prison is one such paradigmatic space, where activists and organizers created a new imagined community during the early phase of the revolt.
The second phase takes place after the liberation of the city in July 2012. It consists of an urban confrontation between the citizens of Manbij and several Salafist groups, who tried to hijack the revolt and impose their sectarian vision of Islam. The main terrain of contestation is the public space and the ways it was appropriated by hegemonic Islamist groups.
The third phase began at the end of 2013, when the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria started a campaign of terror in Manbij. A group of activists created an organization they named “Home” to protect the revolution and preserve the nascent nationalism. In reality, it was a semi-public space that allowed them to operate in the city, despite the ISIS presence.
Clandestine nationalism
The emergence of popular nationalism in Syria should be conceptualized as an iterative process that adapts to various environments. It is the antithesis of official nationalism, which is produced by political leaders who define the contours of the political community and the profile of its citizens. Popular nationalism is a practical nationalism that solves everyday problems. It is built through people’s struggle and their resistance, but also their aspiration for a better tomorrow. Early nationalism that emerged in Manbij and other cities was clandestine. In the early days, it was attempting to find its way to a large audience under challenging conditions. This is why it developed in dangerous or marginal spaces and was used to resist the regime’s violence. Like popular nationalism
of the early twentieth century, which emerged as a tool of resistance against French hegemony and colonization, the nationalism that began to emerge in 2011 should be understood as a vital tool for opposing the regime’s violence. To explore this form of nationalism, it is necessary to analyze the work of clandestine committees that appeared in many cities, including Manbij. Their goal was to organize protests and other actions to undermine the power of the security apparatuses and the army.
Several such committees were created, modeled to a certain extent after the Egyptian experience of neighborhood committees in Cairo, Alexandria, and other Egyptian cities. The main goal of these committees was to prepare for autonomy under challenging conditions. The committees were usually composed of individuals willing to take high risks to liberate their cities. Like their predecessors in the 1920s, they had a deep conviction that struggle against the Assad regime was primarily about decolonizing the authoritarian spaces in which they were forced to live for several decades. The politics of dignity played a central role in the emergent revolutionary culture. In mid-February 2011, during the first protest in Damascus, the crowd chanted, “The Syrian people will not be humiliated!”34 The new nationalism posited itself against authoritarianism, terror, and humiliation. Syrians were committed to liberating their city peacefully through popular protests. Gradually, however, it became clear that the violence of the regime would only increase, and peaceful struggle would not be enough.
After the prayer in the Grand Mosque of Manbij on April 22, 2012, activists held their first public protest.35 It was attended by thousands of residents, who chanted against Assad and his murderous war against Syrians. A few weeks earlier, the Syrian Army had committed a massacre in Taftanaz36 city center and Karm al-Zeitoun in Homs.37 Many residents had joined the Free Syrian Army and were fighting on different fronts, but those who stayed in Manbij were determined to liberate their city.
A secret meeting was organized, and the attendees decided to form several neighborhood committees (North, South, East, and West), where coordinators in each committee would recruit individuals in their respective neighborhoods. The revolutionaries created a structure designed to prevent or limit infiltrations by regime informants. They contacted trusted intellectuals and individuals, and began building networks that functioned almost independently from each other in various neighborhoods.
Activists followed the news of revolts in other countries very closely, and once the protests reached Dara’a, the first city to witness mass organizing against the Syrian regime, the residents of Manbij began thinking about ways to support Dara’a and other rebellious cities, while at the same time expelling regime forces from Manbij. The discussions revolved around developing strategies to counter the violence of the regime. A radical transformation was taking place in Syrians’ mode of thinking. It was the equivalent of a psychic cataclysm in their collective imaginary. The primary purpose of the insurrection was people’s need to regain their humanity and dignity. People quickly realized that spaces of encounter are vital for creating democratic political alternatives. In that regard, popular nationalism cannot be understood outside the politics of dignity and the myriad stories of struggle against daily humiliation and injustice.
During this early period, Syrians experienced a form of decolonization of bodies and beings. It was the result of open discussions about the history of Syria and current political conjuncture. They started developing strategies to fight against the injustice that their people had endured for decades. As noted above, Fanon explains that national liberation in the Global South is incomplete without a radical transformation of culture and economy. That is the main reason why liberation in these countries was pre-empted by neocolonial policies. After independence, the bourgeois class in many African and Asian countries became a comprador class that depended on the West to maintain its grip on power. Their role was instrumental in crushing the aspirations of popular classes. It is in this context that national liberation in Syria should be understood. Revolutionaries were able to create decolonial spaces for the popular classes in Manbij to discuss the future of their city and link their destiny to the struggles of other Syrians who were organizing in Dara’a, Homs, Hama, and elsewhere.
Revolutionaries organized various actions at night, many of which should be read as part of the construction of a political community and an emergent national identity. After a period of several months of intense discussions in clandestine spaces, they took their struggles to the street, knowing they were taking high risks by doing so. Their actions consisted of targeting the symbols of official nationalism embodied in the pictures of Assad and Baath slogans that saturated the public space. They filled the walls of the city with graffiti against the symbols of the decaying regime. The main task for revolutionaries was to erase the traces of the old regime, and as such to decolonize space and being. Unlike official nationalism, which aspires to maintain the structures of oppression, the embryonic nationalism in Manbij was deployed to undo them. As such, it cannot be delinked from the politics of dignity that one could witness in the streets and squares of Manbij, and in which the Syrian revolution is rooted.
Despite their importance, most of these early actions were nocturnal.38 The inhabitants of Manbij started protesting in the streets, drawing graffiti on the moribund walls of their city, tearing down pictures, disfiguring statues of the Syrian despot and his father, and liberating their neighborhoods from the oppressive symbols of the old order by erasing them or painting over them.39 The revolutionaries documented these attacks by taking pictures and making videos, and posting them online.40 By doing so, they were inserting their struggles into a larger national narrative of resistance. There were a multitude of nocturnal actions, many of which took place independently from each other. Activists were building a new culture through their nocturnal journeys and online organizing, and by doing so, they were subverting the official narrative about Manbij.
When the revolution began, most residents believed nothing could happen in Manbij, because the city was perceived as too loyal to the Assad regime.41 These fragmented struggles were reassembled online and given a more coherent meaning. This iterative process between nocturnal actions and online organizing built momentum in Manbij. Many residents organized small-scale actions and posted them online without revealing their identities.42 In some videos, activists covered their heads, while in others, they were seen from behind. The emergent online community undermined the narrative sustained by the regime’s representatives in Manbij.43
Clandestine nationalism was taking place in another important location during this early phase of the revolt. Many of the activists in Manbij and other cities were arrested and put in jail in Aleppo and Idlib, while others were sent to Damascus. Prison became an important space of encounter. For activists, it symbolized dictatorship and oppression in post-colonial Syria. Popular nationalism is, in many ways, the antithesis of what Syria has become under Assad’s rule: a large prison. Since the beginning of the revolt, the regime had arrested a large number of activists from rebellious cities to interrogate and torture them, and to terrorize the population. This strategy backfired, as revolutionaries used their time in prison to meet one another and share their stories of resistance and organizing against dictatorship. In the early phase of the revolt, activists risked their lives by traveling from one city to another to learn from the experiences of others. Ironically, by incarcerating them, the regime created the ideal space for activists. It mixed people from different regions in the prisons of Damascus, Aleppo, and other large cities, and as such provided a space where activists were able to share subversive knowledge and plans at the national level. Fanon writes,
The Algerian national culture takes form and shape during the fight, in prison, facing the guillotine […] national culture is no folklore where an abstract populism is convinced it has uncovered the popular truth. It is not some congealed mass of noble gestures, in other words less and less connected with the reality of the people. National culture is the collective thought process of people to describe, justify, and extol the actions whereby they have joined forces and remained strong.44
This type of space was ideal for the construction of popular nationalism. Syrians who had never had the opportunity to live in such discursive spaces were now inhabiting them. In the early days, the regime was unable to keep activists for more than a few weeks, since it had limited space. During that period, the regime did not kill activists in prison in a systematic way, thinking that such actions would backfire and amplify the scale of the revolt. This obviously does not absolve the regime of the violence it enacted on activists. Activists were released from prison after a few months not because they were a lesser threat to the regime, but because security branches needed to free space for other protesters. By doing so, the revolutionaries of Manbij who had spent time in prison during this early period shared their stories with others, and learned from them. Together, they created a common ground for ongoing and future struggles.
Many activists from Manbij tell stories about the formation of a national identity in prison, articulated around the concepts of resistance, dignity, and justice. Despite the atrocities, prison was a space where activists met others from various regions and different backgrounds, and together discussed the meaning of their struggle at the national level. Their conversation showed that a new national identity was necessary, but could not be built on the old foundations of the Baath nationalism and its hollow slogans. What characterizes nationalism of the first stage is its performative nature and its ability to adapt quickly to the needs of everyday struggles. This nationalism was taking place in peripheral spaces such as the prison. It was also performed at night in central squares that symbolized the coercive power of the central state.
From breaking the silence to decolonising space
The second phase of popular nationalism erupted with the liberation of the city. The process was gradual as protesters occupied more central and visible spaces. Unlike the first period, their actions were now taking place during the day. An increasing number of residents moved their rebellion from the intimate spaces of the household to the street and the neighborhood. They turned the minutiae of everyday resistance into a fully-fledged and mature revolt. Popular nationalism was not confined to the nocturnal hours anymore. Nationalism was an important tool for activists to decolonize their neighborhoods and prepare for the real liberation of Manbij, which requires more than expelling the security forces and state representatives from the city.
Discussing the Arab revolts, Agathangelou explains that the youth created a new relationship between bodies and space, which allowed them to produce a revolutionary political community. She writes, “bodies became the sites that contested those objects and technologies that systematically worked to segregate, discipline, contain, kill them, or let them die.”45
Unlike official nationalism, which has a long intellectual history and is mostly based on the writings of Baath intellectuals, recent popular nationalism is not scripted. One of the important sites for its exploration is the urban texture. In this section, popular nationalism is analyzed through the spatial reconfiguration of the city. The destruction of the Baath party’s symbols and their replacement with ones that embody the values of the revolution was an integral part of this phase.
The primary goal for protesters in Manbij was to regain their humanity and uproot “the sense of nobodiness”46 from their minds and bodies. Several residents explained that by challenging a despotic order, the uprising allowed them to regain their dignity. Fanon writes, “[t]here is a zone of nonbeing, an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an utterly naked declivity where an authentic upheaval can be born.”47 It is against this zone of nonbeing that the insurrection in Manbij should be posited.
The rebellious population created spaces where one could become a human being again. The slogan “Syrian people will not be humiliated!” was a loud cry of freedom from within the zone of nonbeing. In this context, dignity should not be understood as simply a slogan to arouse the masses against the regime. It signals a shift in the theoretical, epistemic, social, and political spheres that could lead to radical transformations in Syrian society. American intellectual John Holloway notes,
[t]he whole relation between theory and practice is thrown into question: theory can no longer be seen as being brought from outside, but is obviously the product of everyday practice. And dignity takes the place of imperialism as the starting point of theoretical reflection.48
The Syrian uprising, and the Arab revolutions more generally, allowed people to negotiate dominant political ideologies whether progressive or reactionary. The politics of dignity embodied in the chants, slogans, and graffiti filled the streets of Manbij after the events of April 2012. These symbols were meant to subvert spaces controlled by the regime. They were the nucleus of a nationalism that is inclusive and emancipatory. In this context, popular nationalism was produced by bodies in movement that gradually decolonized the streets of Manbij from the hegemonic power of the Baath party and its ossified nationalism. In July 2012, the city of Manbij was finally liberated after several months of peaceful protests.
Dignity should guide our analysis in the vast political labyrinth of the Syrian revolution. In this context, dignity should be understood as a hymn of national liberation as it provides Syrians with the conceptual apparatus and performative practices to move from a zone of nonbeing to multiple spaces of existence. The echoes of the slogans in the streets of Damascus and Dara’a represent more than protests against an oppressive regime: they are part of an ontological revolution and a national liberation. Residents in Manbij explained that hearing their own voices in the street, for the first time, was a transformative experience; repeating, “Syrian people will not be humiliated!” or “The people want the fall of the regime!” is in itself a liberatory performance. For protesters, dignity embodies an aspiration for a democratic nation.
Fanon explains that during the Algerian revolution, decolonization of body and mind, the process of regaining a dignified life, was at the core of the struggle, and preceded the independence of a nation colonized by an imperial power. The liberation of territories from security and military apparatuses is a main pillar of popular nationalism. As such, popular nationalism cannot be understood without positioning bodies of protesters at the center of the analysis.
Popular nationalism in Manbij can be examined through the minutiae of people’s everyday struggles, the movement of their bodies in the public space, and the reverberation of their voices in the street. For an external observer, the Syrian uprising seems like a cacophony of voices lacking structure or purpose. A close examination, however, reveals an effervescent society struggling not only for national liberation, but also for new foundations of culture and history, the meaning of the nation and being. Every aspect of Syrian society is experiencing a radical transformation. In Manbij, an increasing number of residents were preparing their city for liberation in spring 2012. A revolution was taking place at every level, starting from the mundane aspects of everyday life to the most complex facets of society, culture, and nation.
After the liberation of Manbij, revolutionaries removed the symbols of the old order and replaced them with graffiti that represented the diverse cultures of the city. An analysis of public space in Manbij could help us to understand the construction of the new imagined political community. As indicated above, popular nationalism since 2011 has been operating a dual move: 1) a connection to a past that precedes Assad’s rise to power; and 2) a rejection of official nationalism.
After the liberation of the city, Syrians erased all symbols of Assad and his regime by removing his statues and pictures. They replaced them with graffiti representing the martyrs of the uprising and revolutionary slogans. They renamed certain streets and public squares, and beautified the walls in the city center.49 Near the revolutionary council, activists painted a portrait of Bassel Shehada, a Christian film-maker who left the United States, where he was studying, to return to Syria and participate in the revolution.50 Beneath his picture was one of Mashaal Tammo, the Kurdish leader who was killed by Syrian security in Kamishlo in October 2011.51 Beneath them was a drawing of Hamza al-Khatib, the 13-year-old boy who was tortured to death by Syrian security in May 2011.52 Several slogans about democracy and inclusion accompanied the graffiti. One of them stated, “[s]ectarianism is a bullet that will kill the revolution.”53
However, the patriarchal culture in Manbij invisiblized women and their struggles. Revolutionary women were not depicted on the walls of the city. This is tragic, since women have played a central role in the Syrian revolt since the beginning.54 In Manbij, women organized several important campaigns through the Future’s Youth and other organizations.55
In the months following the liberation of the city, newly formed groups initiated numerous projects to further the decolonization of their city. Several were proposed by “Future’s Youth organization,” a group of activists whose goal was to improve the living conditions in the city.56 They organized campaigns to help internally displaced persons, educate children and keep them away from the streets, and provide equipment and medication to hospitals. Just as importantly, the group planned a number of symbolic activities to clean the streets and walls of Manbij. They recruited young residents for these campaigns to help transform the city. One of these campaigns was named, “My City is My Home,” and was meant to change the residents’ relationship with their city.57 It invited the residents to take back their city and remove anything that reminded them of the criminal regime.
The cleaning campaign had a dual meaning: the first is literal, the second symbolic. First, by removing the piled trash from the sidewalk, the residents produced a more hygienic and enjoyable city. Second and more importantly, they needed to cleanse Manbij of all symbols of the old order. To help achieve that goal, they organized a campaign to beautify the walls. The Future’s Youths invited artists to paint revolutionary graffiti and slogans on the walls near the city center. A group member explains, “[We] are decorating the walls in order to liberate them from the regime’s grip.”58 One piece of graffiti depicted the corrupt neoliberal class that benefited from Assad’s rule. It was represented as a wealthy man devouring a pile of food by himself, without sharing with anyone. Another one showed a colorful mural of Manbij, with an inscription: “A happy announcement to the residents: there is an explosive barrel bomb for every house, every school, and every bakery.”
In March 2013, activists in several cities, including Manbij, organized a street festival to celebrate the second anniversary of the revolution. In addition to film screenings and a theater performance, several outdoor workshops about beautifying the city were organized.59 These performances were very well attended although women were mostly absent. The flag of the revolution could be seen throughout the city. It was the symbol of a new Syria and a future without Assad. This festival and other cultural activities were meant to delink Manbij from its despotic past and give people a chance to re-appropriate their city.60
After the liberation of the city, activists organized several campaigns to paint the flag of the revolution in the city and remove the remaining symbols of the Baath party. These activities were meant to decolonize the spaces that were previously occupied by regime forces. The organization of concerts in the city center was part of that re-appropriation of space that the Baath regime had sullied. In addition, the juxtaposition of contradictory styles of music, namely, rap and traditional, was symptomatic of the new Syria and its emergent popular nationalism. The rebellious rap music signaled a clear rejection of the old totalitarian order, while traditional music showed an attachment to a past untainted by Assad’s rule. The flag of the revolution, which emerged in 2012, represented a clear rejection of the old flag, which the Assad regime adopted in 1980. The revolutionary flag was from the post-independence period, but was replaced by the Baath party in 1963.61
After the liberation of the city, the central prison, an important symbol of Assad’s tyrannical order, was turned into a local attraction. People who visited the carceral space saw dark and filthy micro-cells and were reminded of Assad regime’s history of violence. The inhabitants of Manbij were persuaded that the old order belonged to a morbid past, and that a new era without Assad was possible.
By the end of 2012 and early 2013, several military factions tried to control the grain mills and bakeries under the pretext that bread is a strategic commodity, and as such should be protected by powerful military groups. Al-Nusra, an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Syria, the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS), and Ahrar al-Sham, a large Salafi group present in the city of Manbij, all tried to take control of the mills, silos, and bakeries; but the revolutionary council mobilized the population and organized a robust resistance to prevent them from taking over these vital institutions. Part of the multifaceted resistance against Islamist groups took the form of graffiti and slogans on the walls of the city. During this period, slogans such as “ISIS Out!” and “Ahrar Out!” could be seen in different neighborhoods, and especially the city center. Before the jihadist groups’ presence in the city, the residents organized a protest on September 28, 2012 to call for the unification of all FSA groups in the city. When ISIS tried to remove the flags of the revolution, kidnap activists or religious clerics who disagreed with the terrorist group’s politics, or take over the revolutionary council, they faced immense popular resistance.
For example, on July 9, 2013, city residents and activists organized a protest in front of ISIS’s headquarters. The protest was also one of the first in Syria, and signaled to the terrorist group that massive resistance to their takeover should to be expected. Protesters chanted slogans against the Islamic State: “ISIS Out! Manbij is Free!” and “Your state is no different from Assad’s!”62 From that point on, the relationship between the revolutionary council and ISIS became very tense. The president of the council received multiple death threats and was forced to work from home. ISIS began removing the flags of the revolution and replacing them with their black flags. The jihadist group wrote inscriptions on the city center’s walls that reminded residents that ISIS’s real enemy is not the Syrian regime, but revolutionary forces. These slogans were against secularism, nationalism, freedom, and democracy.63
Most residents perceived these Islamic groups as an extension of Assad’s regime. Their efforts to suppress grassroots movements and impose their own ideology was similar to the regime’s despotism in many ways. Popular nationalism in Manbij was not posited against Islam. Rather, residents were opposed to the ISIS brand of Islam. Most people rejected their sectarian and fundamentalist ideology and viewed them as foreign invaders. One activist who worked with the revolutionary council reminded people in summer 2013 at a protest against the terrorist group, “We are Muslim! We don’t need anyone to Islamize us.” Popular nationalism during that period was pushed back to the private and semi-private space.
Incubator nationalism
After the protests against ISIS, popular nationalism took a different and subtler form. It receded into a semi-private space, as its appearances in the public arena had become riskier. Black paint gradually covered revolutionary slogans, while the flag of the revolution was replaced with ISIS’s black flag. The best representation of this period is probably the establishment of “Home,” a youth organization that created a communal space for the residents of Manbij in the midst of the gradual control of their city by ISIS fighters. The young activists conceived the project as a space of resistance against ISIS.
Home was established in September 2013 to work with children and teenagers on several projects. It screened movies and offered painting workshops to children, and Turkish classes to residents who planned to move to Turkey. Paradoxically, Home’s organizers were helping build a homeland abroad by teaching residents Turkish and assisting them in leaving the city. Most importantly, Home opened a space where the youth of Manbij could discuss arts, politics, the revolution, and the fate of their city, and by extension their nation. It was named “Home” because its founders felt that the revolutionary spaces were shrinking in Manbij, and that the situation in Syria was becoming more complex. One of the activists involved in the project explains:
The Syria we were dreaming of, and aspiring to create, is becoming an illusion. Sectarianism and fundamentalism are eating us up. This is why we felt the need to create a home to preserve whatever can be preserved and start planning all over again.64
The campaign named “My City is My Home,” which was described above, was paradigmatic of that second period, while the youth project “Home” became the focal point during the third period. Despite their lack of funding and the repeated threats by ISIS, they operated for several months under considerable pressure. ISIS understood the danger of leaving such a space available, knowing it would function as an incubator for nationalism and Syrianness, both of which were antithetical to ISIS’s transnational sectarian ideology.
During this transitory period, Manbij became the hub for ISIS foreign fighters. The city was dubbed “Little London” due to the large number of British jihadists who lived there. In addition, French, Germans, Chechens, Russians, and other foreigners moved into Manbij to participate in the rebirth of the Islamic caliphate.65 Evidently, these ISIS foreign fighters considered Syrian nationalism a major threat. For them, nationalism was a secular Western ideology that had to be crushed at any cost.
In January 2014, clashes between opposition groups and ISIS erupted in most of Northern Syria. Revolutionaries evicted ISIS from Manbij and prevented the jihadist group from re-entering their city for almost two weeks. But ISIS came back with reinforcements, and shelled Manbij for several days before taking it back. The founders of “Home” fled the city and put an end to an important initiative. Some of them are currently living in Turkey, where they continue their tumultuous journey by protecting what remains of Syrian popular nationalism.
Conclusion
The three phases of popular nationalism, namely, clandestine, decolonial, and incubator nationalisms, show that the emergent discourse in Syria is facing major challenges as it develops and adapts. The nationalism that emerged in Manbij was primarily meant to counter the Syrian regime’s authoritarian discourses. Popular nationalism constitutes a culture of resistance that was gradually delinking from the oppressive structures of the official nationalism of the Baath party, while at the same time reconnecting with earlier histories. The popular nationalism that developed in the early twentieth century to end French colonization and the one that has emerged since 2011 as an oppositional paradigm to counter “Suryia al-Assad” (Assad’s Syria) have much in common. Both produced non-elitist and non-scripted cultural paradigms. Both developed iteratively through experimentation to address everyday problems in a context of war and population displacements. They are oppositional to the state-centric nationalism that was rejected by the population because of its oppressive nature.
Popular nationalism is at a crossroads, since it has been marginalized and challenged by state and non-state actors alike. Popular nationalism in Syria is not only facing the nationalism of the Baath party, it is also competing with Muslim identities imposed by groups such as ISIS, Ahrar al-Sham, and Jabhat al-Nusra. In addition, it was challenged by sectarian and tribal identities operating in multiple localities. Finally, it was also being redefined by Kurdish nationalism, which has become dominant in Northern Syria and in Manbij since 2016. Some of these identities are operating below the nation-state, while others are functioning above it. They are challenging popular nationalism to be more creative, open, and inclusive. This is one of the major challenges for popular nationalism in the coming years, as the Arab revolts transform the landscape in the region.
Notes
31. The Syrian regime’s official discourse is one that celebrates Arab nationalism and Arab unity. This discourse is utilized pragmatically by claiming non-sectarian and inclusion. It pretends to be impartial, and does not differentiate between citizens from the various religions and sects. However, the discourse is actually ambivalent, since all the strategic positions of the state are controlled by members of the Alawi sect—an ambivalent discourse that is both inclusive and anti-sectarian, and is strategically deployed against what it wants the minorities to perceive as the fundamentalism and extremism of the Sunni majority. It also insists that only the Syrian branch of the Baath party, which is controlled by the Syrian president, is in a position to define and police the meaning of Arab nationalism.
32. Shayna Silverstein shows that Syrian protesters re-adapted the traditional Dabke dance, what she terms as a “radical Dabke,” to “take back the streets, as well as the cultural symbols of their national heritage,” see Silverstein, “Syria’s Radical Dabke,” Middle East Report 263 (2012), 38. Tahira Yaqoob explains that many Syrian artists use their art as a weapon of war, and as such create a new language and community, see Tahira Yaqoob, “Syrian artists using their medium as a weapon,” The National, March 7, 2013. Accessed June 24, 2016. www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/art/the-syrian-artists-using-their-medium-as-a-weapon#full2013.
33. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington, 204.
34. Misbar Syria, “Demonstration of Syrian anger in Damascus 17 February 2011,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. February 17, 2001. Accessed May 13, 2019. www.youtube.com/watch?v=qDHLsU-ik_Y.
35. Almanbegee, “Demonstration of the city of Manbij on Good Friday,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. April 23, 2011. Accessed May 13, 2019. www.youtube.com/watch?v=mukC1OkE9oc&frags=pl%2Cwn.
36. Javier Espinosa, “Syria: defiance of village where army killed 39 from a single family,” Guardian. Last modified June 8, 2012. Accessed May 13, 2019. www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/08/ syria-defiance-village-taftanaz-massacre.
37. Katie Paul, “Syrian rebels, regime offer dueling tales of Karm al-Zeitoun Massacre,” The Daily Beast. Last modified March 13, 2012. Accessed May 13, 2019. www.thedailybeast.com/syrian-rebels-regime-offer-dueling-tales-of-karm-al-zeitoun-massacre?ref=scroll.
38. Almanbegee, “Night demonstration in the city of Manbij 14/6/2011,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. June 15, 2011. Accessed May 14, 2019. www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vsa6frboFV4.
39. Manbej1, “Attempt to break the statue of the tomb of Hafez al-Assad in Manbij 26/11/20,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. November 28, 2011. Accessed May 14, 2019. www.youtube.com/watch?v=QepBUA1TfP0&frags=pl%2Cwn.
40. Saleh Al-Dandn, “Aleppo Manbij: Raising the flag of Independence at the entrance to the city,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. April 9, 2012. Accessed May 14, 2019. www.youtube.com/watch?v=MUfCWLy9QJ0.
41. Many interviewees reiterated this point. They believe that the revolt would not reach Manbij because of the supposed solid loyalist base present in the city.
42. Saleh Al-Dandn, “Manbij: a night demonstration in Al-Karama neighborhood Nasra al-Hula 26-5-2012,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. May 26, 2012. Accessed May 14, 2019. www.youtube.com/watch?v=FmbdaKW4gqg&frags=pl%2Cwn.
43. This dynamic is evidently not unique to Manbij; many cities had a similar trajectory.
44. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington, 168.
45. Agathangelou, “The living and being of the streets,” 463.
46. Martin Luther King, Jr. “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” April 16, 1963. Accessed June 15, 2016. www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.
47. Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 8.
48. John Holloway, “Dignity’s Revolt,” libcom.org. Last modified November 1, 2005. Accessed June 22, 2016. https://libcom.org/library/dignitys-revolt-john-holloway.
49. The Islamic Brigade in Aleppo and its countryside, “Change the Circle of Abu Pearl in the city of Manbij to Roundabout Omar ibn al-Khattab,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. April 22, 2013. Accessed May 14, 2019.www.youtube.com/watch?v=GMGp5yvqv1k.
50. Kelly McEvers, “Slain Syrian filmmaker traded study for ‘revolution’,” NPR: Obituaries. Last Modified May 29, 2012. Accessed May 14, 2019. www.npr.org/2012/05/29/153937342/student-helped-the-world-see-inside-a-ravaged-syria.
51. Scott Peterson, “Syrian activists galvanized by killing of Kurdish leader,” Christian Science Monitor. Last modified October 11, 2011. Accessed May 14, 2019. www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1011/Syrian-activists-galvanized-by-killing-of-Kurdish-leader.
52. Hugh Macleod and Annasofie Flamand, “Tortured and killed: Hamza al-Khateeb, age 13,” Al Jazeera. Last modified October 11, 2011. Accessed May 14, 2019. www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features /2011/05/201153185927813389.html.
53. DEMOCRACY 4 SY. “Aleppo Youth Institute for Syria,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. December 6, 2015. Accessed May 14, 2019. www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXx4BMHBLTU&frags=pl%2Cwn.
54. Razan Ghazzawi, “Seeing the women in revolutionary Syria,” Open Democracy. Last modified April 8, 2014. Accessed May 14, 2019. www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/razan-ghazzawi/seeing-women-in-revolutionary-syria; Carol Morello, “Role of Syrian women evolves as war rages on,” Washington Post. Last modified January 10, 2013. Accessed May 14, 2019. www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/role-of-syrian-women-evolves-as-war-rages-on/2013/01/09/5308512e-559b-11e2-bf3e-76c0a789346f_story.html?utm_term=.d49ea712dc7c;and Layla Saleh, “In Syria, from fighting to blogging, the many roles of women,” The Conversation. Last modified October 6, 2016. Accessed May 15, 2019. https://theconversation.com/in-syria-from-fighting-to-blogging-the-many-roles-of-women-65176.
55. DEMOCRACY 4 SY. “Aleppo Youth Village, 12-12-2013: Future Youth Authority National Patient Hospital,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. October 13, 2013. Accessed May 14, 2019. www.youtube.com/watch?v=CGYyuuGnbLo.
56. Muhamad Alealli, “Youth Futures authority: footprint of volunteer work in the city of Manbij,” OrientNet. Last modified November 22, 2013. Accessed May 15, 2019. www.orient-news.net/ar/news_show/6335.
57. DEMOCRACY 4 SY, “Aleppo Future Youth for Syria,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. October 30, 2012. Accessed May 15, 2019. www.youtube.com/watch?v=02_M8_tOYuI&t=132s&frags=pl%2Cwn.
58. Saleh Al-Dandn, “Aleppo–Manbij, 13-9-2012: Future Youth for Syria,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. September 13, 2012. Accessed May 15, 2019. www.youtube.com/watch?v=cUjzPfea0ag&frags= pl%2Cwn.
59. Moetaz AboRyad, “Aleppo countryside: within the performance of honoring the martyrs, a free play by a young Syrian 20/9/2013,” (Arabic). YouTube. Video File. September 20, 2013. Accessed May 15, 2019. www.youtube.com/watch?v=VdgwWFfLK7c.
60. “Syrian Street Festival 2013,” Ashar 3. Accessed May 15, 2019. http://ashar3/2013-السوري-الشارع-إحتفالية/com/ar/portfolio
61. Borzou Daraghi, “Syrian rebels raise a flag from the past,” Financial Times, December 30, 2011. Accessed June 25, 2016. www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6c332676-32f4-11e1-8e0d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4JPBrIeLI.
62. Alser ax, “Demonstration against the State of Iraq and the Islamic Shami in the city of Mnabh Brive Aleppo,” (Arabic). Video file. YouTube. July 9, 2013. Accessed June 7, 2016. www.youtube.com/watch?v=OcAN--iVES0&spfreload=10.
63. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi explains in his Ramadan sermon in 2014: Muslims today have a loud, thundering statement, and possess heavy boots. They have a statement that will cause the world to hear and understand the meaning of terrorism, and boots that will trample the idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy and uncover its deviant nature… “Foreword,” Dabiq 12 (2015): 3, https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc48.Interviewee.
64. Interview conducted in Manbij, Syria. December 27, 2013.
65. “FSA ‘closing in’ on Manbij as Islamic State in retreat,” Syria Direct. Last modified February 15, 2015. Accessed May 15, 2019. https://syriadirect.org/news/fsa-closing-in-on-manbij-as-islamic-state-in-retreat/.
Comments