“This is the first time that China has officially brokered an international accord, and also its first involvement in the Middle East: the US has dominated this area of strategic importance for more than 70 years, despite its pivot to Asia at the start of the century.
China’s success is partly due to favourable circumstances: Riyadh’s desire to assert its independence from Washington (especially after the US was slow to come to the rescue after terrorist attacks on its oil installations in 2019); and Iran’s concerns over its economic crisis as well as anti-government protests and threats of Israeli attacks on its nuclear facilities. There is also the growing tendency of countries of the global South not to follow the West’s lead.
This diplomatic initiative was driven by the need for hydrocarbons. Saudi Arabia became China’s leading supplier of oil; Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also began supplying natural gas and oil.
Between 2002 and 2022, China’s foreign direct investment totalled $106.5bn in Saudi Arabia, nearly $100bn in Kuwait, and more than $64bn in the UAE.
Chequebook diplomacy has also paid off politically: at the UN Human Rights Council meeting in July 2020, none of these Arab countries voted to censure China for its repression of the (Muslim) Uyghurs in Xinjiang.”
In return China did not criticise the killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.
“China’s leaders are consistent, at least, emphasising that they don’t interfere in other countries’ domestic affairs as they assert their geopolitical vision.”
China, according to Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s regular press conference (Beijing, 7 March 2023) has declined to enter into any political or military alliance that could create a ‘cold war mentality’ and ‘camp-based confrontation’.
“After the aggressive diplomacy of his second mandate (2017-22), Xi seems now to be putting greater emphasis on negotiation, even seeking to include countries the West has excluded.
The Iran-Saudi agreement may not withstand the region’s geopolitical tensions. Its first stress test will be Saudi Arabia’s security in regard to the war in Yemen.
The rebels [in Yemen] welcomed the agreement but are not likely to stop fighting the Yemeni government forces, which Saudi Arabia has been supporting.
The strength of the Iran-Saudi agreement will also be measured in terms of the two countries’ relations with Israel, which sees the rapprochement as dangerous to its future. Iran opposes any normalisation of relations with Israel and frequently criticises countries that have signed the Abraham accords.
If Tel Aviv, now isolated on the Iran nuclear issue, decided to implement its ‘plan B’ – a unilateral attack on Iran – Saudi Arabia and the UAE would have to convince Iran that they are neither accessories nor supporters.
Regardless, the resumption of diplomatic relations with Iran is a success for MBS. It confirms his independence from Washington and his ability to impose his will on the Sunni clerics who have always opposed any rapprochement with Shia Iran.”
—Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2023
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