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Between the Politics of Life and the Geopolitics of Death: Syria 1963-2024 (Part 2)

The first two chapters investigate the devastating implications of macropolitics. They analyze the geography of violence deployed by the regime to crush revolutionary forces. They unpack the concept of macropolitics in the context of the Syrian revolt. They show that macropolitics is often undemocratic, destructive, and counter-revolutionary. It is no coincidence that regional powers, Western elites, as well as international institutions would choose a macropolitical lens to apprehend the Syrian conflict. By doing so, these actors deliberately chose to sideline revolutionary struggles and consequently empower the Syrian regime. These chapters examine the multidimensional strategies utilized by the regime and other hegemonic actors to undermine grassroots resistance.

The following chapters propose a micropolitical analysis of the Syrian uprising by focusing on Manbij. Grassroots resistance is by definition local, heterogeneous, and complex. This suggests that only an exploration from below could examine the multifaceted revolutionary praxes. It starts with an analysis of popular nationalism since 2011. The main purpose of emergent nationalism is to counter the despotic ideology of the Baath party. In addition, these chapters analyze micropolitical processes in the liberated territories and the challenges revolutionaries face on a daily basis. Micropolitics can take many forms including the management of the city, the distribution of bread in war-torn territories, and underground resistance in regions controlled by regime forces. Overall, the book proposes two alternative readings of the events in Syria since 2011. The first one revolves around state violence and its destructive impact, while the second suggests that a politics of life could shed light on micro-processes that are mostly invisible to external observers. Finally, it shows that the politics of life can emerge from within the cracks of the geopolitics of death.

Using the concept of “necropolitics,” Chapter 1 proposes a taxonomy of death in Syria since 2011. Death in its various manifestations is a crucial entry point to understanding the anatomy of violence. The Syrian regime employed various technologies of death including starvation, torture, siege, indiscriminate bombing, chemical attacks, massacres, assassinations, etc… For a distant observer, the lethal violence appears indiscriminate but a thorough analysis shows there is a rationale beneath the orgy of death in Syria. The analysis demonstrates that each type of death (slow/quick; sensational/ordinary; random/calculated…) serves a specific purpose. In the end, the regime’s success in crushing the revolt, at least temporarily, resides in its ability to continually optimize and carefully calibrate its lethal techniques. 

Chapter 2, “The Geography of Death in Aleppo,” provides an in-depth study of urban destruction (urbicide) in Aleppo, the second largest city in Syria. Revolutionary forces liberated eastern Aleppo in July 2012 and controlled it for more than four years until its fall in December 2016. The city offers a strategic site to examine the uneven geography of violence as well as its scale and intensity. The analysis focuses on the Syrian regime’s utilization of spatial strategies to subdue the population and weaken grassroots struggles. The regime’s urban warfare is informed by Aleppo’s history as well as its social and demographic compositions. For example, the location of fixed checkpoints as opposed to mobile ones was carefully determined. The aerial maps show that despite their inaccuracy, barrel bombs were dropped on specific areas while chemical and clusters bombs targeted others. Urbicide in Aleppo represents a microcosm of the war that is still raging in the rest of Syria.

Chapter 3, “Nation against State: Popular Nationalism and the Syrian Uprising,” examines nationalism in the context of the Syrian revolt. Through their struggles for freedom and self-determination, Syrians produced a new form of popular nationalism. This nationalism was dominant at least during the first two years before Islamic forces became hegemonic. It was deployed during the uprising as a tool for cultural resistance against the regime’s instrumentalist and despotic nationalism. Simply put, official nationalism is scripted, monolithic, and rigid. Popular nationalism is elusive, performative, and plurivocal. To justify its grip on power, the Baath party weaponized nationalism for more than half a century. The cultural clash between these two nationalisms is the logical result of the military confrontation that is happening on the ground. 

Chapter 4, “The Politics of Bread and Micropolitical Resistance,” examines the geography of bread in Syria since 2011 using two approaches. The first approach explores the political economy of bread with a focus on state policies and economic programs under the Baath rule. It analyzes the ways the state handled wheat shortages and prevented bread riots in the past. The Syrian regime used bread as a lethal weapon during the revolt to suppress opposition and undermine grassroots resistance. In the second part of the chapter, the focus shifts to the minutiae of everyday resistance and the ways the residents in Manbij developed new strategies to produce, transport, and distribute wheat. These strategies were essential for the survival of the population and the continuation of the revolt. An analysis of the geography of bread in war-torn Syria allows for a better understanding of grassroots politics. 

Finally, Chapter 5, studies micropolitical struggles and local governance in the liberated territories using Manbij, a city in Northern Syria, as a compelling example of successful grassroots governance during the two-year period between the Syrian regime’s withdrawal from the city in 2012 and the Islamic State’s takeover in 2014. During this interregnum, revolutionary forces reconfigured the city from the ground up by creating inclusive spaces, forming horizontal networks, and building democratic institutions. A micropolitical analysis of the revolt reveals a complex reality where military confrontation plays a peripheral role. Everyday resilience and unrelenting organizing constitute the backbone of the Syrian revolution. Revolutionary forces in Manbij overcame important challenges such as the lack of resources or the violence of the regime and built a vernacular form of democracy. Through experimentation, they created new institutions to transform their city and make it livable. The study shows that reality in the liberated regions is much more complex than the way it is represented in the media or in public discourses.

Yasser Munif (Pluto Press 2020)

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