Excerpts
The coup in August 2020 was welcomed by a population tired of the corruption and incompetence of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s government. But the new regime grew increasingly hardline and eventually banned political parties in May 2025.
Most opposition figures are now in exile, notably the imam Mahmoud Dicko, who leads from Algiers the Coalition of Forces for the Republic, set up in December 2025, and the communist Oumar Mariko, president of the now dissolved African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence party, who tried unsuccessfully to mediate with JNIM to secure the release of 17 hostages in March 2026.
Even so, the regime still retains some popular support. ‘The jihadists have failed to stir up the population as they’d hoped,’ says Senegalese journalist Abdou Khadre Cissé.
Spending on military equipment and security is draining state finances, prompting new taxes on mobile phone top-ups and money transfers via phone. In jihadist-dominated areas, people endure racketeering and violence resulting from the strict application of sharia law. In addition to deadly terrorist raids, Russian forces have committed abuses and the FAMa have carried out lethal operations.
Mali’s instability has deep roots. It faces a problem unresolved since it gained independence in 1960: the demographic distortions caused by how colonial borders were drawn and the resulting claims made by the Tuareg and semi-nomadic farming and herding communities. The decentralisation policy of the 1990s failed to provide a satisfactory model of autonomy, and the explosion of economic and social inequalities under the impact of IMF policies in the 1990s and 2000s further weakened a state already struggling to stamp its authority on the whole country.
In this context, the war in Libya in spring 2011 provided an unexpected boost for destabilisation and secessionism, just as jihadist movements were beginning widespread recruitment among unemployed young people with few other prospects. In the north of the country, these movements took the place of the failing state, dispensing justice, distributing aid and settling land disputes. This combination of intercommunal, political, economic and social factors made Mali the Sahel’s weak link when the Islamists mounted a regional offensive.
The fall of Kidal and the 25 April attacks have enabled Algiers to regain a foothold in the Sahel theatre and portray itself once again as a regional power, no longer isolated but working for stability and peace.
Algerian intercession reportedly enabled negotiations with the insurgents to secure the safe withdrawal of Russian forces trapped in Kidal. And Algiers continues to press, via multiple diplomatic channels, for a meeting between Bamako and the FLA in order to resume negotiations on decentralisation in northern Mali. By contrast, no developments appear to be on the horizon regarding JNIM, the jihadist organisation over which Algiers repeatedly insists it has no influence, contrary to what Bamako asserts.
Algeria’s desire to return to the Great Game in the Sahel can be attributed to the spectre of the break-up of Libya, where several foreign armed forces remain on the ground. Indeed, Algeria’s leaders fear that Bamako, weary of its own military failures and the Russians’ ineptitude, may look to other partners.
While Morocco remains reluctant to get involved militarily as that would provide Algeria with a reason to go to war, the United Arab Emirates – which is already present in Libya, Sudan and Somalia, and is currently on poor terms with Algeria – may well exploit the situation to extend its influence across the continent.
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